The concept of gene in the twenty-first century: What are the open avenues? by El-Hani, Charbel N. & Meyer, Diogo
© Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía: Suplemento 18 (2013), pp. 55-68. ISSN: 1136-9922 
Departamento de Filosofía, Universidad de Málaga, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras 
Campus de Teatinos, E-29071 Málaga (España)
The concept of gene
in the twenty-first century:
What are the open avenues?
El concepto de gen en el siglo veintiuno.
¿Qué vías están abiertas?
CHaRbEL NIÑO EL-HaNI
History, Philosophy and Biology Teaching Lab (LEHFBio), Institute of Biology, 
Federal University of Bahia, Salvador, (Brazil).
DIOgO MEyER
Institute of Biosciences, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, (Brazil)
	 Recibido:	23-1-2013		 	 Aprobado	definitivamente:	22-2-2013
abSTRaCT
The view of the gene as a structural and functional unit has been increasingly challenged by 
findings	mostly	resulting	from	eukaryote	research.	We	can	classify	these	challenges	in	three	
kinds: (i) one-to-many correspondences between DNa segments and RNas/polypeptides (as, 
for instance, in alternative splicing); (ii) many-to-one correspondences between DNa segments 
and RNas/polypeptides (as in genomic rearrangements, say, those involved in the generation of 
diversity in lymphocyte antigen receptors); (iii) lack of correspondence between DNa segments 
and	RNAs/polypeptides	(as,	for	example,	in	mRNA	editing).	However,	even	if	a	single	definition	
of	a	gene	may	not	be	a	realistic	(or	even	helpful)	goal,	being	able	to	have	different	definitions	
connected to each other –operationally and theoretically– is of central importance.
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RESUMEN
La	idea	según	la	cual	el	gen	es	una	unidad	estructural	y	funcional	se	ha	visto	cada	vez	más	
cuestionada a causa de descubrimientos realizados en investigaciones con eucariotas. Podemos 
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clasificar	los	desafíos	planteados	a	dicha	idea	en	tres	tipos:	(i)	correspondencias	uno-a-muchos 
entre segmentos de aDN y aRN/polipéptidos (como, por ejemplo, en el empalme alternativo); 
(ii) correspondencias muchos-a-uno entre segmentos de aDN y aRN/polipéptidos (como en 
las reorganizaciones genómicas, tales como las implicadas en la generación de diversidad en 
los receptores de antígenos de los linfocitos); (iii) falta de correspondencia entre segmentos del 
aDN y aRN/polipéptidos (como, por ejemplo, en la edición del aRNm). Sin embargo, incluso 
si,	por	estas	razones,	no	sería	realista	(o	incluso	útil)	buscar	una	definición	única	de	gen,	es	de	
capital	importancia	que	seamos	capaces	de	formular	diferentes	definiciones	conectadas	entre	
sí teórica y operacionalmente.
PaLabRaS CLavE
CONCEPTO DE gEN, DEFINICIÓN, aDN
i. introduction: the crisis of the gene concept
the gene concept has Been one of the Landmarks in the history of science 
in the 20th century. However, there are nowadays persistent doubts about the 
meaning and contributions of this concept. There are negative and positive 
reactions to the problem of the gene (El-Hani 2007). For instance, while Keller 
(2000) suggested that we should leave the gene concept aside, Knight (2007) 
claimed that «reports of the death of the gene are greatly exaggerated». The 
crisis of the gene concept is related to its persistent interpretation as a stretch 
of DNA that encodes a functional product, a single polypeptide chain or RNA 
molecule, i.e., the so-called classical molecular gene concept (Griffiths	&	
Neumann-Held 1999; Neumann-Held 1999; Stotz et al. 2004). 
This	 concept	 brought	 together	 structural	 and	 functional	 definitions	 of	
the gene, alongside with an easily understandable mechanics, and showed 
considerable heuristic power in genetics and molecular biology. However, this 
picture changed since the 1970s, as the view of the gene as a structural and 
functional	unit	was	increasingly	challenged	by	findings	mostly	resulting	from	
eukaryote research. We can classify these challenges in three kinds: (i) one-
to-many correspondences between DNa segments and RNas/polypeptides (as, 
for instance, in alternative splicing, black 2003; graveley 2001); (ii) many-to-
one correspondences between DNa segments and RNas/polypeptides (as in 
genomic rearrangements, say, those involved in the generation of diversity in 
lymphocyte antigen receptors, Cooper & alder 2006; Murre 2007); (iii) lack 
of correspondence between DNa segments and RNas/polypeptides (as, for 
example, in mRNa editing, Hanson 1996; Lev-Maor et al. 2007).
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ii. reformuLating the gene concept
Several proposals for reformulating the gene concept appeared in the last 
20 years. We will just mention some of them here, with no intention of being 
exhaustive or providing detailed discussion.1 Some authors argued against the 
idea of genes as units and proposed, instead, views about genes as combinations 
of nucleic acid sequences that correspond to a given product (Fogle 1990, 2000; 
Pardini & guimarães 1992) and might be located in processed RNa molecules 
(Scherrer & jost 2007a,b). These proposals accommodate challenges such as 
overlapping and nested genes by denying the idea of genes as units in DNa. 
Fogle (1990, 2000), for instance, treats genes as sets of domains in DNa, 
an assemblage of embedded, tandem, and overlapping domains, «[…] a collec-
tion	of	component	entities	that	together	define	its	structure	and	influence	the	
phenotype» (Fogle 1990, p. 367). Domains are nucleotide sequences that can 
be distinguished from each other on the basis of their structural properties 
and/or activities: exons, introns, promoters, enhancers, operators, leader and 
trailer sequences, etc. In this manner, genes are not in DNa anymore, but only 
domains, what allows this proposal to accommodate many challenges to the 
classical molecular concept.
Other authors put forward a process-oriented view of genes. In Neumann-
Held’s «process molecular gene concept», for instance, genes are not treated as 
«bare DNa», but as the whole molecular process «[…] that leads to the tem-
porally and spatially regulated expression of a particular polypeptide product» 
(Griffiths	&	Neumann-Held	1999,	p.	659).	Since	different	epigenetic	conditions	
that affect gene expression are in this way built into the gene, this proposal 
can accommodate challenges such as alternative splicing or mRNa editing. 
Epp (1997) proposed that we need to separate two distinct concepts related to 
genes,	namely,	a	specification	of	what	is	a	gene	and	an	indication	of	how	it	is	
used.	He	claims	that	the	term	«gene»	points	to	the	former,	but	Griffiths	and	
Neumann-Held take the contrary position, arguing that it points to the latter. 
They justify this option by emphasizing that «the concept of the gene has always 
been	intimately	linked	to	how	genes	are	used	in	development»	(Griffiths	and	
Neumann-Held 1999, p. 658). In the process molecular gene, the focus lies on 
gene function. a description of what a gene is as a physical entity is taken as 
a	necessary	but	 not	 sufficient	 condition	 to	 understand	 it,	 given	 the	 context-
dependence of gene function.
Moss (2001, 2003) distinguished between two meanings ascribed to genes 
and, consequently, demarcated two concepts, gene-P and gene-D, which have 
been	usually	conflated	throughout	the	20th century.2 gene-P amounts to the gene 
1  For detailed discussion, see Meyer et al. (in press). 
2  Knight (2007) provides critical comments on Moss’ proposal to distinguish between 
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as determinant of phenotypes or phenotypic differences. It is an instrumental 
concept, not accompanied by any hypothesis of correspondence to reality, and 
this is what allows one to accept the simplifying assumption of preformationist 
determinism. a simple genotype-phenotype mapping is accepted for the sake 
of modeling. Indeed, gene-P is useful to perform a number of relevant tasks in 
genetics, such as pedigree analysis. When we refer to gene-P, we speak of it as 
if it caused, by itself, a phenotype, as in the commonly used concept of a «gene 
for» (Kendler 2005), which became rather central in «gene talk» (Keller 2000) 
in science and society. For instance, when we speak of the gene for blue eyes, 
we speak of the genes as if they determined the trait «blue eyes». However, there 
are many cases in which the «gene for» the trait has no material counterpart, 
for example, when several alleles affect the normal functioning of the bioche-
mical processes involved in the development of the trait –say, the biochemical 
pathways that lead to the synthesis of eye pigments. The concept «gene for blue 
eyes» corresponds, in fact, to a disjunction of alleles that can be responsible 
for a decrease of pigmentation in the iris. and, certainly, this disjunction is a 
logical expression, not a material entity to which the concept can be said to 
refer. This does not deny, however, the usefulness of the concept: to understand 
the results of a crossing between a brown-eyed father and a blue-eyed mother, 
we	can	readily	use	pedigree	analysis,	accompanied	by	the	apt	simplification	
of assuming that there are genes that determine the presence of brown or blue 
eyes. We can say, thus, that gene-P is an instrumental concept that has predictive 
power and plays an important role in some explanatory games of genetics and 
molecular biology. It is capable of doing so through the assumption of simple 
genotype-phenotype mapping, which is not problematic when restricted to this 
context. but this did not happen in the history of genetics.
gene-D, in turn, amounts to the gene as a developmental resource in cau-
sal	parity	(Griffiths	&	Knight	1998)	with	other	such	resources	(say,	epigenetic	
ones).	It	is	conceived	as	a	real	entity	defined	by	some	molecular	sequence	in	
DNa which acts as a transcription unit and provides molecular templates for 
the synthesis of gene products. It is in itself indeterminate with respect to the 
phenotype (Moss 2003, p. 46), that is, a gene-D typically does not determine 
by itself phenotypic traits, but acts as a developmental resource involved in the 
construction of traits, alongside with other equally important resources, such 
as epigenetic and environmental factors.
Model	reification	is	a	recurrent	problem	in	science	and	simplifying	assump-
tions used for the sake of modeling often become loaded with metaphysical 
connotations. Thus, simple genotype-phenotype mapping was projected onto 
gene-P and gene-D. We will not deal with these comments here, but they were addressed in 
Meyer et al. (in press).
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reality,	giving	rise	to	genetic	determinism,	a	view	with	serious	socioscientific	
consequences (for a recent discussion, see Scott 2013). as a consequence of such 
reification,	gene-P	and	gene-D	has	been	and	still	are	conflated.	But,	as	Moss	
argues, even though genes can be productively conceived in these two different 
ways, nothing good results from their conflation (Moss 2001, p. 85). 
The ENCyclopedia of DNa Elements (ENCODE) project is an internatio-
nal	scientific	consortium	aiming	at	identifying	the	functional	elements	in	the	
human genome sequence.3	Among	its	contributions,	we	find	a	new	definition	
of gene: «[…] a union of genomic sequences encoding a coherent set of poten-
tially overlapping functional products» (gerstein et al. 2007, p. 677, emphasis 
in the original). Here, different functional products of the same class (proteins 
or RNas) that overlap in their usage of the same primary DNa sequences 
are combined in the same gene, and, thus, several challenges to the classical 
molecular concept are accommodated by abandoning the unitary relationship 
between genes, gene products, and gene function. For instance, the products 
of alternative splicing are taken to be products of a single gene, since they 




Some works strive for solving the gene problem by building new languages 
that cut up the genetic system into novel categories, organizing our understanding 
into different sets of concepts (Keller & Harel 2007; Scherrer & jost 2007a,b). 
On the one hand, this may solve, or dissolve, problems and limits posed by 
our	current	language	about	genes.	On	the	other,	there	is	an	expected	difficulty	
of translation between the new languages and the ones already established in 
the	fields	of	genetics	and	molecular	biology,	which	may	hamper	researchers’	
understanding of those new ways of speaking and, thus, their acceptance. To 
maintain	sufficient	bridges	between	new	and	older	ways	of	 speaking	seems	
crucial for the success of these proposals.
Keller and Harel (2007) propose an alternative to both the concept and the 
word «gene», replacing them by a closely related concept and term, although 
situated in an entirely different logical level, the dene. The dene is part of a 
more encompassing concept, the genetic functor,4	or	genitor,	G,	defined	as	a	
triple G = (O, D, B), where O	is	an	organism	of	a	specified	type	(i.	e.,	with	spe-
3  The ENCODE database can be reached at http://www.genome.gov/10005107#4. The 
participants of the ENCODE can be found at http://www.genome.gov/26525220. See also The 
ENCODE Project Consortium (2004).
4  In category theory, a functor is a special type of mapping between categories, informally 
defined	as	maps	between	categories	that	preserve	structures	or,	alternatively,	as	a	homomorphism	
between categories (Marquis 2011).
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cified	genetic	and	behavioral	properties),	D, a dene, and B, a bene. The dene is 
a statement about O’s DNa (or, more precisely, a truth-valued function of O’s 
DNa sequence) and the bene, a statement about O’s behavior (more precisely, 
a truth-valued function of O’s temporal life-span).
The dene is a concept intending to capture the bases of genetic transmission, 
but, differently from the gene, it does not denote merely a stretch of DNa. Ra-
ther, a dene is a general kind of statement about DNa (a predicate or property) 
representing much more intricate characteristics of this molecule than the simple 
statement that it contains a particular expressed subsequence. Even though the 
constitutive elements of the dene are in DNa, the dene itself does not reside 
in this molecule, because it is at a different logical level, as a statement about 
it, or designated property of it. The dene may refer to the entire genome of an 
organism,	or	to	some	contiguous	or	disjoint	parts	of	it,	with	fixed	or	variable	
boundaries, and with overlapping or iterated subsequences, possessing functional 
meaning,	even	if	not	expressed.	The	dene	is,	thus,	a	very	flexible	statement	about	
DNa, which can accommodate challenges to the classical molecular concept. 
Keller and Harel’s framework has a distinctive advantage in relation to our 
current language about genes: it provides a clearer separation between structure, 
that is, what constitutes the organism and, thus, what it materially inherited, and 
function, that is, what the organism dynamically does with what it inherited, or, 
to put it differently, its functionality and behavior. The dene is a statement about 
DNa as a static entity and, thus, says nothing about function in and by itself. It 
is	the	bene	that	specifies	the	behaviors	associated	to	(not	determined	by)	DNA	
sequences, as a statement about how the organism dynamically develops, lives, 
behaves, etc. This is a broad and rich statement, referring to complex modal 
and temporal characteristics of the organism’s behavior over time, irreducible 
to simple statements about, say, protein synthesis or transcription. 
Finally, it is the genitor that expresses the functional relation between D 
and B, connecting static and dynamic aspects. This relation is more complex 
than the simple genotype-phenotype mapping found in genetic determinism: the 
bene does not simply follow from the dene, but only has the dene as one of its 
parts, alongside with O’s environment, developmental mechanisms, epigenetic 
processes, and so on. 
In their proposal of a new language to talk about genetic systems, Scherrer 
and jost (2007a,b) depart from two distinct aspects involved in the production 
of polypeptides –coding and regulation– to arrive at the proposal that we need 
distinct terms to account for them. The problem of the gene is conceived, thus, 
as resulting from the ascription of a very large diversity of meanings to a single 
term. Conceptual analysis can help, then, in solving this problem, as it leads to 
new concepts and terms that embrace meanings previously captured by «gene». 
For Scherrer and jost, our understanding of gene expression should be broken 
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up into gene function, on the one hand, and the mechanisms of storage and 
expression, on the other. The gene is mostly related to the functional aspect. 
We cannot found at the DNa level, however, a unit that can account for gene 
function. They propose, then, that the gene emerges at the level of mature RNas, 
a claim that we will discuss in the next section.
The second aspect, regulation, is related to the process of creation of the 
gene in RNa out of pieces in the genome, which Scherrer and jost call «geno-
mic domains».5 They stress the role of a programme that comes along with the 
transcript and «[…] secures the generation of the gene, in the cellular space and 
in time, through the many steps of gene expression» (Scherrer & jost 2007a, p. 
3).6 This cis -acting regulatory programme is, in their vocabulary, the «genon» 
(a contraction of the terms «gene» and «operon»), which amounts to the addi-
tional information needed to gene expression, contained within each RNa as 
an ensemble of signals, that is, potential binding sites for regulatory proteins, 
RNas or ribonucleoproteins. The genon is both added to and superimposed 
onto the coding sequence. Each genon is unique to each distinct mRNa and 
polypeptide and, thus, to each gene, even though two different genes and genons 
can share DNa segments. When the cell builds a gene out of DNa sequences, 
it also builds a corresponding genon.
besides the cis -acting regulatory programme corresponding to the genon, 
gene	regulation	depends	on	an	ensemble	of	regulatory	factors	codified	in	other	
chromosomes that potentially recognize and act on the signals in cis found in 
a given genon. Scherrer and jost call this ensemble the «transgenon». as the 
genon of an mRNa is immersed into a pool of trans-acting factors («holo-
transgenon») which are capable of recognizing signals or «oligomotifs» in the 




domain containing fragments of one or several genes coordinated by cis controls separated, pos-
sibly, by insulators, often unit of transcription and, in some cases, of replication». This concept 
is potentially important for dealing with the problem of intergenerational transmission if genes 
are located in RNa, as we will discuss below.
6  The notion of «program», particularly when conceived in terms of «genetic programs», 
is highly controversial (e.g., Oyama	[1985]2000;	Nijhout	1990;	Griffiths	&	Neumann-Held	1999,	
Keller 2000), but we will not pursue this discussion here, since it would take us away from our 
major goals in this paper. Scherrer and jost do not elaborate on the concept of «programme», 
although	they	say	that	the	genon	and	transgenon	constitute	a	flexible,	not	rigidly	defined	program,	
to the extent that epigenetic mechanisms of gene expression and transmission modify both the 
genon and its precursors at the DNa level. 
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after translation of a gene found at the mature RNa level ends up, the gene 
is degraded alongside with the genon. as genes are conceived in this framework 
as being created by the cell from their parts encoded in genomic domains in 
DNa and then degraded, they become much more dynamic entities than they 
are in the current picture. Not only challenges to the classical molecular con-
cept are overcome by this proposal (with some remaining exceptions, such as 
alternative modes of translation), but a distinctly different way of understanding 
genes comes to the fore. but is it really reasonable to locate genes in RNa?
iii. genes in rna?
as we mentioned above, Scherrer and jost (2007a,b) locate the gene at the 
level	of	mature	RNAs.	They	propose	the	following	definition	for	«gene»:
[…] the uninterrupted nucleic acid stretch of the coding sequence in the mRNa 
that corresponds to a polypeptide or another functional product; thus, in eukaryotes 
typically not yet present at DNa level, but assembled from gene fragments (exons) 
in course of RNa processing (Scherrer & jost 2007b, p. 106).
For Scherrer and jost, this uninterrupted mRNa sequence is the unit of 
function and genetic analysis, as the equivalent of the polypeptide chain when 
reliably translated. They build this argument by focusing mostly on protein-
coding genes. In the case of genes transcribed into RNa molecules that are not 
translated, the situation is a bit more complex. after all, if there is no proces-
sing involved in the synthesis of a functional RNa, we might locate the gene 
at the DNa level. However, we need to consider how often functional RNas 
are processed and, thus, could have genes located only at the RNa level. In 
fact, most kinds of functional RNas experience post-transcriptional editing. 
For example, tRNa (e.g., abelson et al. 1998), rRNas (e.g., Cech et al. 1981), 
siRNas, miRNas (e.g., Pontes & Pikaard 2008), and snoRNas (e.g., giorgi 
et al. 2001) all have been documented to experience either splicing or editing 
events subsequent to the generation of the primary transcript. For the sake of 
coherence and generality, it is better to locate also in these cases the gene at the 
functional RNa level, claiming that, in the exceptional cases where no proces-
sing is involved, what we would see is equivalence between genomic domain 
(in DNa) and gene (in RNa). It is curious, however, that the aspect of coding 
has no place in genes coding for RNa that are not translated, when conceived 
in these terms: the synthesis of functional RNas does not depend on any set of 
rules	to	translate	from	one	kind	of	polymer	to	another.	But	notice,	first,	that	genes	
are more essentially related by Scherrer and jost to a functional rather than a 
coding aspect, suggesting that we can identify genes with no coding involved. 
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Second, that the problem that there is no coding involved in genes transcribed 
into functional RNa molecules is already present in the current framework of 
molecular biology. The only difference is that this problem comes to the fore 
when one intends to locate genes in RNa.
What could be the advantages of locating genes in RNa? First, it preser-
ves the gene concept, which is not very likely to be dismissed (judson 2001). 
Second, locating genes in RNa can dissolve several challenges that result from 
looking for a structural unit corresponding to the gene at the DNa level. Third, 
this proposal captures the idea of a translation unit and, also, of a transcription 
unit corresponding to the nucleotide sequences of several classes of functional 
RNas. Fourth, there is a good relationship between the location of genes in RNa 
and operational procedures carried out by molecular biologists and geneticists, 
such as those for counting genes.
However, there are also problems with this proposal. First, a close rela-
tionship between genes and DNa has marked biological discourse since the 
double helix (joaquim & El-Hani 2010). To separate genes from DNa is, in 
fact, a substantial effort of reconceptualization, but this may be the price to 
pay in order to rebuild a consistent, parsimonious, and explanatorily powerful 
account	of	genes.	Second,	it	is	difficult	to	think	that	genes	would	only	exist	in	
the zygote as mere possibilities (Keller 2000), since the gene would only be in 
RNa, and in metazoans most of the transmission of genetic information takes 
place through DNa. Third, if located in RNa, genes would not have the perma-
nence and stability usually attributed to them, as a requirement for inheritance. 
Regarding the latter problems, we can replace genes by other intergenerationally 
stable entities when explaining inheritance. genomic domains (as proposed by 
Fogle 1990, and Scherrer and jost 2007a,b), out of which genes are constructed 
by the cell, can play the role of mediating inheritance in the place of genes. 
Then, we might eliminate from the gene the ideas of permanence and stabili-
ty, making it more reasonable to conceive it as a unit of structure and genetic 
analysis in mature RNas.7 Evidently this cannot settle the discussion. It is far 
from being simple and straightforward to disentangle the aspects of permanence 
and stability from the gene: these aspects and, more generally speaking, the 
role of genes in inheritance are at the heart of the gene concept since the very 
beginnings of genetics!
7  Scherrer and jost (2007a,b) treat the gene as both a structural and a functional unit at 
the RNa level. We do not consider, however, that a functional unit can be located in a nucleic 
acid, no matter if DNa or RNa, due to the context-dependence of gene function, which demands 
that we conceive of function in terms of causal roles played by higher-level entities and processes 
in a cell. both DNa and RNa are evidently related to the emergence of these causal roles, but 
not as units to which these causal roles could be reduced. Nevertheless, we cannot expand this 
discussion here.
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iv. concLuding remarks
all these proposals for overcoming the problem of the gene share a shortco-
ming: they keep the intention of proposing a single and all-encompassing de-
finition	for	gene.	Genes	are,	however,	epistemic	objects	constructed	and	used	
in several biological subdisciplines for a diversity of (explanatory, predictive, 
heuristic) tasks. From this diversity of tasks, a diversity of meanings ascribed 
to genes as epistemic objects (Rheinberger 2000) naturally follows. The right 
expectation,	thus,	should	not	be	one	of	proposing	a	single	definition	for	«gene»,	
but, rather, one of providing a clear demarcation of different meanings ascribed 
to this central concept in genetics and molecular biology. 
It is particularly informative to consider the differing usages of the «gene» 
that	 are	 found	 in	 important	 subdisciplines	 of	 biology.	Consider	 the	field	 of	
population genetics, which is concerned with how allele frequencies change 
over time. In this subdiscipline, the vast majority of theoretical work carried 
out treats genes as entities that can modeled from a Mendelian perspective. In 
other words, genes are treated as «balls» which are randomly sampled in the 
process of meioses and placed in «urns» (the new population formed by the 
transmission of gametes). To many of the questions of population genetics, the 
molecular structure, physiological consequences or functional attributes of this 
entity is irrelevant to the modeling process, which is focused on developing 
models that make general predictions on the relative abundance of variant forms 
of these «balls» in each generation. 
Such a perspective lies in strong contrast to a view of the gene as a struc-
tural unit, where its attributes, extension, precise phenotypic effects, among 
other attributes, are of central importance to questions being addressed. In this 
context, knowing the bounds and functional attributes of the gene will be very 
directly	linked	to	the	success	in	addressing	the	scientific	questions	that	motivate	
ongoing research.
However, in closing, it is appropriate to keep in mind inherent limitations 
associated to the adherence to gene concepts that are meaningful in the context of 
a particular subdiscipline. This limitation naturally emerges as that subdiscipline 
itself encounters limitations in carrying out its research program. For example, 
if we are adopting a «balls in urns» model of a gene in order to understand the 
evolutionary dynamics of a species, it may be of key importance to understand 
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having a proper grounding in functional information, allowing the prediction 
of the phenotypic effects to be considered. 
The	above	reasoning	illustrates	how	even	if	a	single	definition	of	a	gene	
may	not	be	a	realistic	(or	even	helpful)	goal,	being	able	to	have	different	defi-
nitions connected to each other –operationally and theoretically– is of central 
importance.
references
abELSON, j., TROTTa C. R. & LI, H. (1998). «tRNa splicing». The Journal of 
Biological Chemistry, 273, 12685-12688.
bLaCK, D. L. (2003). «Mechanisms of alternative pre-messenger RNa splicing». 
Annual Review of Biochemistry, 72, 291-336.
CECH, T. R., ZaUg, a. j. & gRabOWSKI, P. j. (1981). «In vitro splicing of the 
ribosomal RNa precursor of Tetrahymena: Involvement of a guanosine nucleotide 
in the excision of the intervening sequence». Cell, 27, 487-496.
COOPER, M. D. & aLDER, M. N. (2006). «The evolution of adaptive immune systems». 
Cell, 124, 815-822.
EL-HaNI, C. N. (2007). «between the cross and the sword: The crisis of the gene 
concept». Genetics and Molecular Biology, 30, 297-307.
EPP,	C.	D.	(1997).	«Definition	of	a	gene».	Nature, 389, 537.
FOgLE, T. (1990). «are genes units of inheritance?» Biology and Philosophy, 5, 
349-371.
FOgLE, T. (2000). «The dissolution of protein coding genes». In: P. beurton, R. Falk 
& H-j. Rheinberger (Eds.), The concept of the gene in development and evolution 
(pp. 3-25). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
gERSTEIN, M. b., bRUCE, C., ROZOWSKy, j. S., ZHENg, D., DU, j., KORbEL, 
j. O., EMaNUELSSON, O., ZHaNg, Z. D., WEISSMaN, S. & SNyDER, M. 
(2007).	«What	is	a	gene,	post-ENCODE?	History	and	updated	definition».	Genome 
Research, 17, 669–681.
gIORgI, C., FaTICa, a., NagEL, R. & bOZZONI, I. (2001). «Release of U18 snoRNa 
from its host intron requires interaction of Nop1p with the Rnt1p endonuclease». 
The EMBO Journal, 20, 6856-6865.
gRavELEy, b. R. (2001). «alternative splicing: Increasing diversity in the proteomic 
world». Trends in Genetics, 17, 100-107.
gRIFFITHS, P.E. & KNIgHT, R.D. (1998). «What is the developmental challenge? » 
Philosophy of Science, 65, 2, 253-258.
gRIFFITHS, P. E. & NEUMaNN-HELD, E. (1999). «The many faces of the gene». 
BioScience, 49, 656-662.
HaNSON, M. R. (1996). «Protein products of incompletely edited transcripts are 
detected in plant mitochondria». The Plant Cell, 8(1), 1-3.
66
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía. Suplemento 18 (2013)
CHaRbEL EL-HaNI y DIOgO MEyER
jOaQUIM, L. M., & EL-HaNI, C. N. (2010) «a genética em transformação: Crise e 
revisão do conceito de gene». Scientiae Studia, 8, 93-128.
jUDSON, H. F. (2001). «Talking about the genome». Nature, 409, 769.
KELLER, E. F. (2000). The century of the gene. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University 
Press. 
KELLER, E. F. & HaREL, D. (2007). beyond the gene. PLoS One, 2, e1231.
KENDLER, K. S. (2005). «‘a gene for...’: The nature of gene action in psychiatric 
disorders». American Journal of Psychiatry, 162, 1243-1252.
KNIgHT, R. (2007). «Reports of the death of the gene are greatly exaggerated». Biology 
and Philosophy, 22, 293-306.
LEv-MaOR, g., SOREK, R., LEvaNON, E. y., PaZ, N., EISENbERg, E. & aST, g. 
(2007). «RNa-editing-mediated exon evolution». Genome Biology, 8, R29.
MaRQUIS, j.-P. (2011). «Category theory». In: E. N. Zalta (Ed.). The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition).
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/category-theory/>. Retrieved august 
6th 2012.
MEyER, L. M. N., bOMFIM, g. C. & EL-HaNI, C. N. (in press). «How to understand 
the gene in the 21st century». Science & Education. available at: http://link.
springer.com/article/10.1007/s11191-011-9390-z. Retrieved january 22th 2013.
MOSS, L. (2001). «Deconstructing the gene and reconstructing molecular developmental 
systems».	In:	S.	Oyama,	P.	E.	Griffiths	&	R.	D.	Gray	(Eds.),	Cycles of contingency: 
Developmental systems and evolution (pp. 85-97). Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.
MOSS, L. (2003). What genes can’t do. Cambridge, Ma: The MIT Press.
MURRE, C. (2007). «Epigenetics of antigen-receptor gene assembly». Current Opinion 
in Genetics & Development, 17, 415-421.
NEUMaNN-HELD, E. (1999). «The gene is dead – Long live the gene: Conceptualizing 
genes the constructionist way». In: P. Koslowski (Ed.). Sociobiology and 
bioeconomics: The theory of evolution in biological and economic thinking (pp. 
105-137). berlin: Springer.
NIjHOUT, H. F. (1990). «Metaphors and the role of genes in development». BioEssays, 
12, 441-446.
OyaMa, S. ([1985]2000). The Ontogeny of information: Developmental systems and 
evolution (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
PaRDINI, M. I. M. C. & gUIMaRÃES, R. C. (1992). «a systemic concept of the 
gene». Genetics and Molecular Biology, 15, 713-721.
PONTES, O. & PIKaaRD, C. S. (2008). «siRNa and miRNa processing: New 
functions for Cajal bodies». Current Opinion in Genetics & Development, 18, 
197-203.
RHEINbERgER, H.-j. (2000). «gene concepts: Fragments from the perspective of 
molecular biology». In: P. beurton, R. Falk & H.-j. Rheinberger (Eds.), The concept 
of the gene in development and evolution (pp. 219-239). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
SCHERRER, K. & jOST, j. (2007a). «The gene and the genon concept: a functional 
and information-theoretic analysis». Molecular System Biology, 3, 1-11.
67
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía. Suplemento 18 (2013)
The concept of gene in the twenty-first century...
SCHERRER, K. & jOST, j. (2007b). «The gene and the genon concept: Coding versus 
regulation. a conceptual and information-theoretic analysis of genetic storage 
and expression in the light of modern molecular biology». Theory in Biosciences, 
126, 65-113.
SCOTT, E. C. (2013). «This I believe: we need to understand evolution, adaptation, and 
phenotype». Frontiers in Genetics, 3, 1-2.
STOTZ, K., gRIFFITHS, P. E. & KNIgHT, R. (2004). «How biologists conceptualize 
genes: an empirical study». Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological 
& Biomedical Sciences, 35, 647-673.
The ENCODE Project Consortium (2007). «The ENCODE (ENCyclopedia Of DNa 
Elements) Project». Science, 306, 636-640.
charBeL eL-hani is Profesor asociado at the Institute of biology, Federal University of 
bahia, Salvador (brazil).
Research interests: 
Philosophy of biology, biology teaching, history of biology, evolutionary biology and 
animal behavior
Recent publications:
SaNTOS, v. C.; jOaQUIM, L. M. & EL-HaNI, C. N. (2012). «Hybrid deterministicviews 
about genes in biology textbooks: a key problem in genetics teaching». Science & Education 
21: 543-578. DOI: 10.1007/s11191-011-9348-1
aRTEaga, j. M. S. & EL-HaNI, C. N. (2012). «Othering Processes and STS Curricula: 
From	19th	Century	Scientific	Discourse	on	Interracial	Competition	and	Racial	Extinction	 to	
Othering in biomedical Technosciences». Science & Education 21: 607-629. DOI: 10.1007/
s11191-011-9384-x
Email: charbel@ufba.br
diogo meyer is professor at the Institute of biosciences of the University of São Paulo 
(brazil). 
Research interests:
Evolutionary biology and Population genetics
Recent publications:
MEyER, D. and HaRRIS, E. E, 2013. «Nonadaptive genetic Change in Human and Pri-
mate Evolution», in Encyclopedia of Life Sciences, john Wiley & Sons Ltd, Chichester. http://
www.els.net.
SEPÚLvEDa, C., MEyER, D., EL-HaNI, CN. 2011. «adaptacionismo». In: Paulo C. 
Abrantes.	(Org.).	Filosofia	da	Biologia.	1ed.Porto	Alegre-RS:	ARTMED.	p.	162-192.
